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By Thomas L. Hagel*
Defending the Mentally II:
A Discussion of Nebraska's
Involuntary Commitment Proceedings
"Who are you?" said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation. Alice
replied, rather shyly, "I-I hardly know, sir, just at present-at
least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I
must have been changed several times since then."
"What do you mean by that?" said the Caterpillar sternly.
"Explain yourself!"
"I can't explain myself, I'm afraid sir," said Alice, "because I'm
not myself, you see."t
Alice's state of confusion lends an accurate insight into the un-
mapped world of the seriously mentally ill. The attorney repre-
senting a client in a civil commitment proceeding is a stranger, an
intruder, in the boundless nether world of the mentally ill. To ef-
fectively represent his client, an attorney must do his best to famil-
iarize himself with the vital medical, psychological, social, and legal
signposts that dot the otherwise uncharted landscape. If he does
not, his client may very well be deprived of his liberty for an inde-
finite period of time, often in an archaic institution possessing char-
acteristics most commonly found in jail and penal complexes.
This article will discuss various aspects of representing individ-
uals who are allegedly "mentally ill and dangerous," under the pro-
visions of the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act.' The dis-
cussion will deal primarily with the involuntary commitment of
such individuals. Commitment of those accused 'or convicted of
criminal offenses will only be alluded to in passing, while voluntary
admissions to a mental institution will not be addressed. The pur-
pose of this article is to discuss the various problems inherent in
representing mentally ill individuals and to examine the legal and
tactical aspects involved in the handling of such cases. Before em-
* B.S. 1972, University of Nebraska at Omaha; J.D. 1976, University of
Nebraska; Deputy, Lancaster County Public Defender.
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1. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-1001 to 1078 (Reissue 1976).
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barking on the discussion a word of caution is in order. The attor-
ney must remember that there will be few guideposts that will be
of assistance in representing such clients. The applicable statutory
definitions are vague, and the worlds of psychology and psychiatry
are beset with conflicting theories, confusing terminology, and con-
tradictory philosophies. These cautionary notes must be kept in
mind throughout the discussion of the multi-faceted problem of the
involuntary commitment of free people in a free society.
I. INTRODUCTION
The initial problem confronting an attorney in representing an
allegedly mentally ill and dangerous client in a commitment pro-
ceeding is to determine what "role" he should play at such a hear-
ing. This problem creates a serious dilemma. The dilemma in-
volves ethical and humanistic implications which are often in con-
flict. In essence, the question posed is whether the attorney should
act as an adversary in his client's interest, pursuant to the require-
ments of the Code of Professional Responsibility,2 or as a non-ad-
versary "friend of the Board" whose function is merely to advise
the client of his legal rights and to assist in safeguarding them.
The latter non-adversary "role" is often based upon the attorney's
belief that his client is in need of treatment and that an involun-
tary commitment, if provided for in a proposed treatment plan,
would be "in the client's best interest." This role conflict must be
resolved prior to an attorney's entrance into the case. If it is not,
the attorney and the client may be at odds throughout the duration
of the case.
It must be noted at the outset that an attorney's duty to his
client is regulated by the provisions of the Code. For example,
Canon 7 dictates that "a lawyer should represent a client zealously
within the bounds of the law."'13  Further, Ethical Considerations
7-114 and 7-125 refer to the responsibilities of the attorney whose
client is mentally deficient or disabled. However, none of these
provisions set out specific criteria or guidelines to be followed.
Ethical Consideration 7-11 simply states that the attorney's respon-
sibilities "may vary according to the intelligence, experience, mental
condition or age of a client . . . or the nature of a particular pro-
ceeding. Examples include the representation of ... an incompe-
2. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1971). [hereinafter referred to as the CODE].
3. Id. CANON 7.
4. Id. EC 7-11.
5. Id. EC 7-12.
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tent." Ethical Consideration 7-12 merely adds that an attorney may
at times "be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on
behalf of the client" and that in such instances the attorney should
"consider all circumstances" and act to "safeguard and advance the
interests of his client."7  Other than the broad dictate of Canon
7, an attorney is left to find his own ethical path to follow when
representing an allegedly mentally ill client.
It is this lack of specific differentiation among the various "cir-
cumstances" that poses the problem of an appropriate "role" for
the attorney to fill in representing his less-than-competent client.8
In relation to commitment proceedings, the vague language of the
Code offers little guidance. It must be kept in mind that the mental
condition of the client is the heart of the controversy in a commit-
ment proceeding. The lack of a definitive standard raises several
questions. Must an attorney prejudge the mental condition of his
client to his own satisfaction, and then mold his "role" accordingly?
If, in fact, the attorney feels that his client is mentally ill, danger-
ous, and in need of involuntary treatment, should this belief alter
his "role" in "representing a client zealously within the bounds of
the law?" Or should the attorney make every attempt to free his
client from commitment and completely disregard the potential con-
sequences of such freedom to his client? 9 Would it not be less corn-
6. Id. EC 7-11.
7. Id. EC 7-12. EC 7-12 states in part:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders
him incapable of making a considered judgment on his own
behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer. Where
an incompetent is acting through a guardian or other legal
representative, a lawyer must look to such representative for
those decisions which are normally the prerogative of the cli-
ent to make. If a client under disability has no legal repre-
sentative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings
to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is
capable of understanding the matter in question or of con-
tributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of
whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain
acts, the lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If
the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer
should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with
care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.
8. Consider, for example, the different responsibilities of an attorney
dealing with: (a) a client who wants to give all of his possessions
to the poor so as to follow the teachings of Christ; (b) a client
who informs you that he wants to change his will as a result of
his decision to commit suicide; or (c) a client being held for an in-
voluntary commitment hearing due to forty years of chronic alco-
holism. How does the Code apply to these differing situations and
"circumstances?"
9. Consider, for example, a client who has been detained, pending a com-
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plicated and more humane to simply leave the fate of your client
in the hands of the mental health board and concerned physicians?
Can such questions be resolved by reference to the Code?
It is suggested that the solutions to the various conflicts and
quandaries noted above can and must be resolved by the individual
attorney according to his professional judgment. It is further sug-
gested that, after all other circumstances are considered, the in-
dividual attorney must rely upon a literal -interpretation of the
dictate of Canon 7 and represent his client so as to safeguard the
individual from the state's attempt to deprive that individual of his
liberty. The primary reason for such a view is that involuntary
commitment to a mental institution is a deprivation of liberty that
should be subject to constitutional protection. It is incarceration
against one's will, whether it be termed "civil" in nature or labeled
as "treatment."' 0 The dictates of ethics and law must take preced-
ence over humanistic considerations that need not answer to the
rule of law. This is the only avenue open to an attorney in such
cases. All others would result in the abandonment of the client
to the unbridled control and discretion of the medical and social
science professionals who often place a higher value on what they
characterize as "treatment" than upon the right of the individual
to be free. As Justice Brandeis warned, "[e] xperience should teach
us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent.""
II. INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT PROCEDURE
In 1976 Nebraska's laws governing the civil commitment of the
mentally ill were changed dramatically. The change was the prod-
uct of Legislative Bill 806.12 The effect of this legislation was to
completely revamp the civil commitment standards and procedures
in Nebraska.13  This revampment was partially in response to a
mitment hearing, due to his repeated attempts to kill himself after
he finds out that he has incurable cancer and has been in a state
of psychotic depression since learning of his condition. Can the deci-
sion to commit suicide ever be a "rational" choice?
10. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). See also Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Livermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On
the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968).
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (dissenting opin-
ion).
12. L.B. 806, 85th Leg., 2d Sess. (1976).
13. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-325 to 328 (Reissue 1971) (repealed 1976).
Under the prior statutory scheme, local "boards of mental health"
were empowered, with almost unlimited discretion, to involuntarily
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number of court decisions which clarified and established various
legal rights of those characterized as "mentally ill.' 14 An increas-
ing number of courts, at every jurisdictional level, have embraced
the cause of protecting the rights of the mentally ill. The enact-
ment of the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act 15 advanced
this cause by establishing due process safeguards within the com-
mitment procedural framework, thus substantially narrowing the
category of individuals eligible for involuntary commitment. The
result of the enactment of these laws has been to codify constitu-
tional safeguards within the commitment system itself.'6
However, the practitioner must keep in mind that this act is
not the sole source of law applicable to commitment proceedings.
commit individuals to mental institutions for an observation period
of not more than sixty days upon a showing that the individual was
"mentally ill" and in need of hospitalization. The commitment pro-
ceeding was initiated by the filing of an application. If sufficient,
grounds were shown to exist, the board would issue an arrest warrant,
have the individual taken into custody and examined by a board-
appointed physician. A final hearing would then be held in which
the examining physician would report the results of his examination
to the board. If the individual was ordered hospitalized, the hospital
superintendent was charged with his or her care and further evalua-
tion. Depending upon the evaluation of the superintendent, an indi-
vidual could be committed and held involuntarily for an indefinite
period of time. There were no statutory provisions for review or judi-
cial appeal of the superintendent's decision. As a result of these pro-
cedures, certification of indefinite commitment was tantamount to a
"lifetime sentence" to institutions that often more closely resembled
prisons than hospitals. See also R. Pmmucci, CIRCLE OF MADNESS: ON
BEING INSANE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED IN AMERICA (1974).
14. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975). These cases dealt specifically with
the constitutional rights of individuals who were involuntarily con-
fined to mental institutions. The court in Doremus declared unconsti-
tutional NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-325 to 328 (Reissue 1971) (repealed
1976) and § 83-306(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974). The court held that these
statutes failed to provide individuals to be committed with the consti-
tutional protection of due process and equal protection of the law.
For a general overview of recent court decisions in this area, see De-
velopments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190 (1974).
15. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 83-1001 to 1078 (Reissue 1976).
16. An excellent discussion of the historical development of the Nebraska
Mental Health Commitment Act may be found in Peters, Teply,
Wunsch & Zimmerman, Administrative Civil Commitment: The Ins
and Outs of the Nebraska System, 9 CREIGHTON L. REv. 266 (1975), and
Peters, Teply, Wunsch & Zimmerman, Administrative Civil Commit-
ment: The Nebraska Experience and Legislative Reform Under The
Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act of 1976, 10 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 243 (1976).
6 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
Numerous courts have recognized that an involuntary commitment
is a deprivation of liberty within the context and meaning of the
United States Constitution. Thus, specific constitutional rules of
law have been applied to such proceedings. This is true even in
cases where states have provided for some degree of constitutionally
inspired protections within their statutory frameworks. Nebraska
has included provisions for many of these constitutional protections
within the Nebraska Mental Health Commitment Act. 17 However,
these provisions are somewhat vague as to their meaning and scope,
and limited in their application.18 Therefore, an attorney must look
to other sources to fully protect his client's rights.
17. Some of the basic constitutional safeguards found in the Act are as
follows:
1. Notice of time and place of preliminary and final hearing,
list of allegations forming the basis of the petition and per-
sonal service of the summons or notice of the hearing. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 83-1048 (Reissue 1976).
2. Right to counsel and right to appointed counsel for indi-
gents. Id. § 83-1049.
3. Right to discovery. Id. § 83-1053.
4. Right to appear personally at all hearings, testify in his
or her own behalf and present witnesses and evidence. Id.§ 83-1056.
5. Right to compulsory service of process to obtain testimony
of witnesses. Id. § 83-1057.
6. Right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses and
evidence, such right being equivalent to those rights guaran-
teed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and Article one, section eleven of
the Constitution of Nebraska. Id. § 83-1058.
7. Right to have formal rules of evidence applied at all hear-
ings, with the standard for inadmissibility being that as ap-
plied in criminal proceedings. Id. § 83-1059.
8. Right to a transcript of all proceedings. Id. § 83-1061.
9. Right to appeal final orders of the Board to the District
Court, with further appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska.
Id. § 83-1043.
10. Right to a review as to treatment, disposition or dis-
charge. Id. § 83-1046.
11. Right to file petitions or applications for writs of habeas
corpus to challenge the legality of such subject's custody or
treatment. Id. § 83-1066 (9).
12. Right to engage or refuse to engage in religious worship
and political activity. Id. § 83-1066 (6).
13. Right to be free from involuntary servitude. Id. § 83-
1066(7).
These enumerated rights are not all of those found in the Act. They
are, however, some of those that have significant constitutional conno-
tations within the meaning and content of the United States Consti-
tution.
18. Consider, for example, the provisions of NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1059
(Reissue 1976), dealing with the rules of evidence and the standard
for the inadmissibility of evidence. In referring to "criminal proceed-
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III. APPLICABILITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
From the foregoing it is clear that an involuntary commitment
infringes upon the most precious and basic right guaranteed and
protected by our nation's constitution-the right to liberty itself.
For this reason courts have applied constitutional principles to com-
mitment proceedings. 19  Though the present state statutes guar-
antee to an individual the most important constitutional protections
relative to such proceedings, these statutes have never been inter-
preted by appellate courts as to their scope of meaning and applica-
tion. Therefore, an attorney must analyze those court decisions
that have delineated the constitutional protections, above and be-
yond statutory schemes, afforded to the mentally ill in such pro-
ceedings.
For example, involuntary commitment without notice or a hear-
ing is a denial of liberty without due process of law in violation
of the fourteenth amendment. Nebraska law, of course, provides
for notice and a hearing prior to commitment. However, such stat-
utes are clearly inadequate in protecting the liberty of persons who
are detained and held at the discretion of any peace officer for a
commitment hearing.20 Such detention and possible incarceration
ings," does the statute intend to make applicable the rules of evidence,
as to inadmissibility, that apply at the trial of criminal offenses or
those applied at preliminary hearings held in felony cases? See NEB.
REv. STAT. § 27-1101 (Reissue 1975). Is it the intent of section 83-
1059 to make the "exclusionary rule" applicable to commitment hear-
ings? Is the intent to make the "Miranda rule" apply to such hear-
ings? If so, must the examining doctor, usually an "agent of the
state," read a subject his or her "Miranda warnings" prior to inter-
viewing the subject? These are not merely hypothetical questions.
They have arisen at hearings. They can only be resolved by legisla-
tive revision or appellate review. To date, at least two federal courts
have held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies in com-
mitment proceedings and that a person could not be committed, on
the basis of statements made to a psychiatrist, unless they were made
with knowledge of a right to remain silent. See Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp.
1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473, aff'd on rehearing, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975). See also Aronson, Should the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric
Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REv. 55 (1973); Note, Application of the
Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to the Civil
Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DuxE L.J. 729.
19. See Note, Substantive Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, 7
U.C.D. L. REv. 128 (1974); 24 DRAKE L. REV. 213 (1974).
20. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1020 (Reissue 1976) reads as follows:
Mentally ill dangerous person; custody prior to mental
health board proceedings; where detained. Whenever any
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"in a jail," can take place on a peace officer's whim. Therefore,
an attorney must be prepared to look to the area of constitutional
law that developed to protect individuals' rights to due process of
law prior to a denial of liberty.2 '
Next, an attorney must realize that the subject of a commitment
hearing may be deprived of his liberty by the mental health board.
This board is a quasi-judicial body. All questions of law and fact
are decided by the board alone. The sixth amendment clearly se-
cures the right to trial by jury when the possibility of 'a deprivation
of liberty is present in both federal and state criminal prosecutions.
22
The key ingredient in interpreting this right is the possibility that
one might lose his liberty. If one accepts this as true, should not
an individual subjected to -a commitment proceeding have the right
to choose a jury to decide the issues of fact? Is not an involuntary
commitment for an indefinite period of time a substantial depriva-
peace officer believes that any individual is a mentally ill
dangerous person and that the harm described by section 83-
1009 is likely to occur before mental health board proceedings
under this act may be invoked to obtain custody of the indi-
vidual, such peace officer may immediately take such in-
dividual into custody, cause him or her to be taken into cus-
tody, or continue his or her custody if he or she is already
in custody. When a mental health center or a state hospital,
or other government or private hospital, has the capability
to detain such an individual in the county in which the indi-
vidual is found, the individual shall be placed in such facility.
When no such facility exists, the individual may be placed
in a jail.
It could be argued that this statute is unconstitutional, as violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. No standards
or criteria are set out that a peace officer must meet or apply in
arriving at his "belief" that an individual is a "mentally ill dangerous
person." There are no limits on the officer's discretion in detaining
and holding individuals. There are no provisions for review of the
officer's actions prior to his detaining the person. Finally, one must
ask whether the constitutional requirement of "probable cause" under
the fourth amendment must be met prior to "seizing" an individual
and holding him or her to await a commitment hearing. See Orozco
v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Gior-
denello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
21. See Comment, 10 SuFFOLK U. L. Rv. 76 (1975); 53 J. URBAN L. 305
(1975); 43 TENN. L. REv. 366 (1976). One might also consider the
applicability of Nebraska's statutes concerning writs of habeas corpus
to clients who are, or have been, detained and held under the provi-
sions of section 83-1020. See NEB. Rav. STAT. §§ 29-2801 to 2824 (Reis-
sue 1975).
22. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968). These cases speak in terms of cases where the
possible deprivation of liberty is "substantial" (over six months). See
also Humphreys v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
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tion of liberty within the context of the constitution? It is difficult
to accept, in terms of jurisprudential and social policy, that the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial can be asserted in a "criminal" case
involving a maximum six month jail term, yet cannot be asserted
at a hearing which may culminate in an involuntary commitment
for life, simply because the state chooses to classify commitment
hearings as "civil" in nature. Such a classification cannot be jus-
tified in law, logic or by some form of misdirected social policy.
The protection afforded by the constitution should not be denied
those facing involuntary confinement simply because the proceed-
ing is said to be in the "best interest" of the one threatened with
confinement.
It may be argued that in some involuntary commitment cases
the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment may be violated.23 Though the concept of "cruel and un-
usual punishment" has historically been limited to the worlds of
criminal law and procedure, it can be argued that it applies to in-
voluntary commitment cases.2 4 It has been sugggested that confin-
ing mentally ill persons who are dangerous but not treatable is
constitutionally questionable.25 One court has even held that inde-
finite commitment without adequate treatment may be so inhu-
mane as to constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" or a denial
of due process of law. 26 This is a very real and persistent problem
in state hospitals. This issue will be discussed in relation to 'appeal
and review procedures later in this article.
Finally, the construction and wording of some of the commit-
ment statutes raise due process issues due to their vagueness. At
present, the "vagueness principle" has only been applied in cases
where criminal statutes have been challenged as too vague and in-
definite. It would appear, at first glance, that this constitutional
principle does not apply to the standards applicable to commitment
hearings. However, it can be reasonably argued that the under-
lying principle in due process disfavors vague standards because
23. T. SzAsz, LAw, IZBRTY, AND PSYCHIATRY 188-89 (1963).
24. For a discussion of the concept of "cruel and unusual punishment,"
see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) and Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962). See also Schwartz, In the Name of Treatment:
Autonomy, Civil Commitment and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 50
NoTRE DAvm LAw. 808 (1975).
25. Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures,
79 HARV. L. REv. 1288, 1290-91 (1966).
26. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See also Com-
ment, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 295 (1974); Comment, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q.
787 (1974).
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they allow state officials to arbitrarily decide who shall be con-
fined.27 Logic would suggest that this principle would apply to in-
voluntary commitment standards.
In conclusion, it must be noted that this article has 'only touched
upon a few of the numerous constitutional issues and principles
arising from commitment proceedings. This area of law is growing
daily. An attorney must keep in touch with these developments
because the constitution may prove to be the only effective weapon
in saving a client from a lifetime of confinement.
IV. HEARING PROCEDURES
The machinery of a civil commitment proceeding is put into mo-
tion by the filing of a petition with the clerk of the district court
of the county within the judicial district where the "subject" 28 re-
sides or is located. 29 Any person may file a commitment petition
as long as it is approved by the county attorney. In essence, the
petitioner must state or allege that the subject of the petition "is
a mentally ill dangerous person."30 The petition must also "include
a description of the behavior which constitutes the basis for the
petitioner's concluding that the individual is a mentally ill danger-
ous person."' 1 Further, the petition must allege that neither volun-
tary hospitalization nor other less restrictive alternatives are avail-
able or would suffice to prevent the "harm" described and defined
by statute that would or might be the product of the subject's al-
leged "dangerousness. "32 Finally, the petitioner must verify the
27. See Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
28. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1014 (Reissue 1976).
29. Id. § 83-1025.
30. Id. §§ 83-1024, 1025.
31. Id. § 83-1025.
32. The two-fold concept of a "mentally ill dangerous person" does not
lend itself to precise definition. However, the Nebraska Legislature
has codified its interpretation of this double-edged concept. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-1009 (Supp. 1977) reads as follows:
Mentally ill dangerous person; defined. Mentally ill dan-
gerous person shall mean any mentally ill person or alcoholic
person who presents:(1) A substantial risk of serious harm to another person
or persons within the near future, as manifested by evidence
of recent violent acts or threats of violence or by placing oth-
ers in reasonable fear of such harm; or(2) A substantial risk of serious harm to himself within
the near future, as manifested by evidence of recent attempts
at, or threats of, suicide or serious bodily harm, or evidence
of inability to provide for his basic human needs, including
food, clothing, shelter, essential medical care, or personal
safety.
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contents of the petition and have it approved by the county attor-
ney.33
Once the petition is filed stating the county attorney's belief
that the immediate taking into custody of the subject is necessary,
a warrant will be issued directing the county sheriff to take the
subject into custody and hold him pending the preliminary hear-
ing.34 The subject can be held at the discretion of the mental health
board in a jail, mental health center, or a private or state hospital.35
However, if the county attorney believes that no need exists to have
the subject held prior to the hearing, the clerk of the district court
merely issues a summons to be served by the county sheriff on the
subject. 36 The summons must be served along with a copy of the
petition, a list of statutory rights of the subject relative to the pro-
ceeding,37 and a list containing the names, addresses, lnd telephone
numbers of the mental health professionals by whom the subject
may be evaluated prior to his preliminary hearing.38 Should the
subject fail to appear at the preliminary hearing the mental health
board may issue a warrant to have the sheriff take him into cus-
tody.39
There are certain times when the circumstances will not permit
the authorities to go through the summons procedure. This prob-
lem often arises -in cases where an individual, who is allegedly men-
tally ill, is involved in acts which may seriously endanger the safety
of others or himself. In these cases a "peace officer" 40 may take
the individual into immediate custody.41 Upon placing the person
in a holding facility, the peace officer must execute a written certifi-
cate alleging his belief that the person in custody is a mentally
ill dangerous person, that harm will come to the subject or others
if the subject is not held prior to the hearing, and a summary of
the subject's behavior supporting these allegations. 4 2 However, the
person being held has a right to be evaluated by a "mental health
professional," 43 not later than thirty-six hours after being taken
into custody to see if there is sufficient reason to hold the person.44
33. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1026 (Reissue 1976).
34. Id. § 83-1028.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 83-1027.
37. These statutory rights are contained in id. §§ 83-1047 to 1067.
38. Id. § 83-1027.
39. Id. §§ 83-1027, 1028.
40. Id. § 83-1011.
41. Id. § 83-1020.
42. Id. § 83-1021.
43. Id. § 83-1010.
44. Id. § 83-1023.
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If the mental health professional finds that cause does not exist to
hold the person, he must be released immediately unless proceed-
ings are initiated or pending before the mental health board.
Once the subject is taken into custody, or served with a sum-
mons, the adversary nature of the commitment proceeding becomes
apparent. The subject will either be allowed to retain counsel or
have an attorney appointed to represent him throughout the pend-
ing action.45 At this point in time it is very important for the sub-
j ect's attorney to move quickly in preparing his case. It is sug-
gested that there are two basic goals to be achieved at the outset:
First, attempt to interview the subject to obtain all possible informa-
tion that may have a bearing on his background and mental condi-
tion; second, attempt to ascertain whether the subject will agree
to some form of voluntary treatment. The second goal rests upon
the proper finding of fact that the subject is in need of some form
of voluntary treatment. Such treatment might include voluntary
admission to a hospital, obtaining out-patient treatment at a mental
health center, or an agreement to continue in a previously estab-
lished treatment program.
Strong emphasis should be placed on the goal of voluntary treat-
ment. There are two primary reasons for this, one medical and
the other legal. First, most mental health professionals agree that
the potential for success in treating the mentally ill is much higher
when the individual voluntarily seeks treatment. Though this is
not always a possible or viable alternative, the individual's coopera-
tion in treatment should always be sought. The legal considera-
tions and consequences of voluntary treatment are significant. The
primary consequence of such an alternative is the avoidance of the
possibility of an indefinite commitment by the mental health board.
For example, anyone may apply for voluntary admission to any
public or private institution for treatment.4 6 If accepted, the pa-
tient has the right to be discharged upon giving twenty-four hours
notice of his desire to leave. 47 Therefore, the patient is insulated
from the very real possibility of indefinite confinement in an in-
stitution as a consequence of a commitment proceeding. Thus an
attorney should always investigate the possibility of .voluntary
treatment prior to a formal commitment hearing.
The commitment hearing process is two-tiered. The first, or
"preliminary" hearing must be held no later than five days after
a subject is taken into custody. The second, or "final" hearing
45. Id. § 83-1049.
46. Id. § 83-1019.
47. Id.
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must be held no later than fourteen days after the preliminary
hearing.48 However, the applicable statutes clearly state that both
hearings should, if possible, take place within five days of the sub-
ject being taken into custody.4 9 In any event, the stated goal is
to grant the subject a speedy hearing and disposition of the contro-
versy.
As noted above the preliminary hearing is the initial forum in
which to answer the allegations. One may compare it to a prelimin-
ary hearing held in a felony case. In essence, it is a "probable
cause" hearing. The statutory description of the hearing is as fol-
lows:
[A] preliminary hearing shall be held by the mental health board
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the
subject of a petition is a mentally ill dangerous person, and that
neither voluntary hospitalization nor other alternatives less re-
strictive of his or her liberty than a mental health board ordered
treatment disposition are available or would suffice to prevent the
harm described in section 83-1009. .... 50
It can be seen that there is a similarity between the issues presented
in such a hearing and a preliminary hearing in a felony case. How-
ever, the "elements" that must be shown to exist in a preliminary
commitment hearing lack the specificity of those that must be
shown to exist in a comparable criminal proceeding.
Essentially, the state must show that there is probable cause
to believe that: (1) the subject is mentally ill, (2) due to his or
her illness the subject is dangerous relative to the criteria found
in section 83-1009, 51 (3) voluntary hospitalization or some other less
restrictive alternative is not available, and (4) anything other
than board ordered treatment would not suffice to prevent the
harm alleged in the petition. The burden of proof rests with the
county attorney. If the county attorney fails to sustain the burden
of proof as to all four elements the board must dismiss the petition
and discharge the subject. 52  If probable cause is found the case
will usually be set for a final hearing.53
However, there appears to be a statutory "catch" in the above
mentioned procedure. This catch could be referred to as an alterna-
tive to a finding of probable cause:
If the board concludes that there is probable cause to believe that
48. Id. §§ 83-1027, 1030.
49. Id.
50. Id. § 83-1031.
51. Id. § 83-1009.
52. Id. § 83-1032.
53. Id. § 83-1033.
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the subject is a mentally ill dangerous person, but that voluntary
hospitalization or other treatment alternatives less restrictive of
the subjects' liberty than a mental health board ordered treatment
disposition are available and would suffice to prevent the harm
described by section 83-1009, the mental health board may either
dismiss the petition and unconditionally discharge the subject, or
suspend further proceedings for a period not to exceed ninety days
from the date of the preliminary hearing in order to determine
the results of voluntary treatment alternatives.5 4
Thus, upon the limited finding that the subject may be a mentally
ill dangerous person and that voluntary or other less restrictive
treatment alternatives are adequate and available, the subject may
be either discharged or the proceedings suspended. If a suspension
is ordered the county attorney must file an application of reinstate-
ment within ninety days. If he does not the board must dismiss
the petition and discharge the subject.5 5
The "catch" referred to above consists of the lesser standard of
probable cause. By making the limited finding described above the
board is allowed to retain jurisdiction over the case. Such suspen-
sions are often used to force individuals into treatment with the
threat of further commitment proceedings. It could be argued that
such a provision violates a subject's rights under section 83-1031, 56
in that either the county attorney must meet his burden of proof
or the petition is dismissed-period. When a client's liberty is at
stake, is this an unreasonable expectation? For this reason it is
suggested that counsel always move for a dismissal of the petition,
in lieu of a suspension.
After a waiver of the preliminary hearing,57 or a finding of
probable cause at the conclusion of such hearing, the case will be
set down for a final hearing. The hearing itself can be compared
to a trial in both substance and procedure. The sole issue is
whether the petition should be dismissed and the subject of the
hearing discharged, or whether the subject should be committed
to an institution for what might be the rest of his life. Though
the core issue may be stated rather simply, its resolution is a lab-
yrinth of complicated legal and medical concepts that are often so
vague as to elude the grasp of the average attorney.
54. Id. § 83-1032 (emphasis added).
55. Id.
56. See text accompanying note 50 supra.
57. Under NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1064 (Reissue 1976) the subject may waive
his or her right to a preliminary hearing. However, it is suggested
that one should never enter such a waiver. This suggestion is based
on the fact that a preliminary hearing is an excellent opportunity
to discover and analyze the amount, type and quality of evidence that
underlies the petition.
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The material elements to be proven by the county attorney in
a final hearing are strikingly similar to those dealt with at the
preliminary hearing:
A final hearing shall be held by the mental health board to deter-
mine whether there is clear and convincing proof that the subject
of a petition is a mentally ill dangerous person and that neither
voluntary hospitalization nor other alternatives less restrictive of
his or her liberty than a mental health board ordered treatment
disposition are available or would suffice to prevent the harm de-
scribed in section 83-1009.58
It is obvious that the same elements that must be shown under
the "probable cause standard" at the preliminary hearing must also
be established at the final hearing. However, at the final hearing,
these elements must be established by "clear and convincing proof."
It could be argued that this standard of proof is constitutionally
inadequate and that the standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt"
should be applied since there is a possibility that the subject may
be deprived of his liberty.59 Such a deprivation should not be con-
sidered any less serious than a comparable loss of liberty under
criminal sanctions merely because it takes place at the hands of a
mental health board.
To discuss the burden of proof in a commitment hearing in a
logical manner requires dealing with each material element separ-
ately. In so doing the interdependent relationship of the elements
may be clearly seen. The failure to prove any individual element
should result, as in criminal cases, in the discharge of the subject.
V. MENTAL ILLNESS
Society's blind reliance on medical judgments as to who is, or
is not, mentally ill is misguided. Psychiatry and psychology have
not attained the level of a pure science. It can be reasonably ar-
gued that psychiatry is more an art than a science.60 There are
as many concepts of "mental illness" as there are "schools" of psy-
chiatric thought. In essence, the diagnostician has the ability to
58. Id. § 83-1035.
59. Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard
v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, aff'd on rehearing, 379 F. Supp. 1376
(E.D. Wis. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975); The
"Crime" of Mental Illness: Extension of "Criminal" Procedural Safe-
guards to Involuntary Civil Commitments, 66 J. CnM. L. & Cnv n-
NOLOGY 255 (1975).
60. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flip-
ping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. Rnv. 693 (1974).
16 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 57, NO. 1 (1978)
classify nearly any person as being mentally ill, based merely on
his own particular concept of mental illness.6 It has even been
suggested that the concept of mental illness is a myth.62 However,
the issue of whether the subject is mentally ill is the initial element
to be proven in a commitment proceeding. Therefore, the attorney
must learn the criteria used by psychiatrists in making their diag-
nosis.
The accepted standards and criteria used in the diagnosis of
mental disorders are found in the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders.6 3 This slim, loose-leaf manual contains clas-
sifications for all mental disorders recognized by the American
Psychiatric Association. However, unless the layman is well versed
in psychiatric jargon the manual will be of little value. The goal
of the attorney should be to discover the precise diagnosis alleged
and determine whether it fits within the guidelines set forth in
the Manual.
At the hearing the examining physician will normally present
his diagnosis of the subject's mental condition. This diagnosis will
be classified according to the criteria set out in the Manual. More
often than not, the physician will find that the subject is afflicted
with some type of "psychosis." A psychotic disorder is considered
to fall within the class of the most severe mental illnesses. 64 How-
ever, the present statutes do not specifically require a finding of
psychosis in order to make a finding that a mental illness is present.
rn fact, section 83-1009 might be applied so as to label almost any
form of unconventional or antisocial behavior as "mental illness."6 ;
Under a recent revision, section 83-100966 now includes alcoholism
61. Roth, Dayleh, & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and
Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 40 (1973).
62. T. SzAsz, supra note 23, at 11-17.
63. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. 1968).
64. L. HiNSIE & R. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 619-28 (4th ed.
1970).
65. N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THER-
APY (1971); T. SzAsz, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
66. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 83-1009, 1009.01 (Supp. 1977). Though these stat-
utes have made alcoholics subject to commitment, they are vague as
to what degree of this illness must be shown to sustain a commitment.
The DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, supra
note 63, at 41-42, classifies the various forms of alcoholism as "person-
ality disorders" or "non-psychotic mental disorders," not forms of psy-
chotic illness. Three basic forms of alcoholism are classified: episodic
excessive drinking, habitual excessive drinking and alcohol addiction.
Id. at 45. These classifications are, in essence, based upon the degree
of use and involvement of alcohol in the individual's life. Under the
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as a form of mental illness. These factors should be kept in mind
due to the fact that numerous studies have demonstrated the dubi-
ous validity and reliability of psychiatric diagnosis of mental ill-
ness.
67
The hinge pin of the state's case will be the psychiatrist's testi-
mony. His opinion concerning a subject's mental condition will be
the most important evidence considered by the board. Conse-
quently, the cross-exanination of the state's psychiatrist or psy-
chologist is perhaps the most important aspect of the case. An at-
torney should use cross-examination to test the foundation on
which the witness bases his opinions concerning the presence of a
mental illness in the subject and the element of dangerousness.
Cross-examination also offers an opportunity to establish a founda-
tion for asserting a subject's right to an alternative less restrictive
than commitment.
A diagnosis of mental illness by a psychiatrist can be challenged
on two distinct grounds: (1) that the reliability of such a diagnosis
is exceedingly low due to its unscientific formulation, and (2) that
the validity of such a diagnosis is insignificant. In taking the first
approach, numerous studies can be cited that demonstrate the lack
of uniformity and agreement among qualified clinicians in their
evaluation of a person's mental condition. 68 A series of questions
can be devised that demonstrate the potential for inaccurate and
mistaken assessments of mental illness or of specific types of mental
illness.6 9 When effectively presented, these questions can create
a cloud of suspicion over the credibility and validity of the psy-
chiatrist's assessment and opinions. They will often show that the
opinions are based only on -a cursory examination of the subject,
that few if any of the accepted objective tests7 0 used in the field
present statute, what degree of alcoholic illness or "addiction" must
be shown as the basis of a commitment? Must it be shown that the
subject is "addicted" before he or she can be committed? Since al-
coholism is not a form of psychosis, is such an illness an appropriate
basis for an involuntary commitment? It is suggested that these ques-
tions can only be answered through an appropriate revision of the
statutes so as to specify what, in fact, the Legislature had in mind
when defining an "alcoholic person"e as "a person addicted to the use
of alcohol." A layman's concept of "addiction" may be far different
from that described in the MANUAL.
67. J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PsYcHIATRIc TEsTIMONY (1970); Ash, The Re-
liability of Psychiatric Diagnosis, 44 J. ABNORMAL Soc. PSYCH. 272
(1949).
68. See authorities cited in note 67 and accompanying text supra.
69. J. ZIsKIN, supra note 67, at 224-26.
70. J. DAVIS & J. FOREYT, MENTAL ExAMINER's SouRCE BOOK (1975); M.
BLINDER, PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE Or LAW (1973). Both
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were administered, and that certain variables were not considered
when forming the opinions. 71 With a carefully designed cross-
examination, an attorney can undermine the psychiatrist's assess-
ment that the subject has a mental illness requiring commitment.
VI. PREDICTION OF DANGEROUSNESS
Courts and legislatures across the country have experienced
great difficulty in fashioning a valid and reliable test for determin-
ing whether a person is able to care for himself. However, in recent
years, courts have required a finding of dangerousness as a requisite
to an involuntary commitment.72  These courts have further re-
quired that a prediction or assessment of dangerousness be based
on a finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do substantial
harm to oneself or others.73 Nebraska's statutory scheme concern-
ing such a finding complies substantially with these court opinions.
The Nebraska statute defines the elements of dangerousness as en-
tailing:
(1) A substantial risk of serious harm to another person or
persons within the near future, as manifested by evidence of recent
violent acts or threats of violence or by placing others in reason-
able fear of such harm; or
(2) A substantial risk of serious harm to himself within the
near future, as manifested by evidence or recent attempts at, or
threats of, suicide or serious bodily harm, or evidence of inability
to provide for his basic human needs, including food, clothing,
shelter, essential medical care, or personal safety. 74
It is clear that this statute basically complies with the requirements
and criteria set forth by various courts. However, the meaning of
the above quoted language is deceptively simple. The process of
predicting the occurrence of such behavior is much more elusive.
of these books are excellent sources of information concerning the
various objective tests used in diagnosing mental illnesses. They ex-
plain these tests and suggest areas for cross-examination of psychia-
trists.
71. J. ZIsKiN, supra note 67, at 219-24; M. BL=NDER, supra note 70, ch.
XIII.
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Doremus v. Farrell, 407
F. Supp. 509 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.
Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
The court in Lynch specified the minimum findings necessary to sup-
port an involuntary commitment: (1) the person to be committed
must be found to be mentally ill; (2) the person must pose a real
and present threat of substantial harm to himself or others; (3) the
danger posed by the person must be evidenced by a recent overt act;
and (4) there must be treatment available for the illness diagnosed.
73. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
74. NEB. RIv. STAT. § 83-1009 (Supp. 1977).
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The major responsibility in determining dangerousness or inabil-
ity to care for oneself rests on the examining psychiatrist. In es-
sence, he must make a prediction as to future behavior. Such a
prediction is, at best, a qualified guess3 5 This is complicated by
the fact that any assessment of behavior is dependent upon the be-
havior being understood in reference to its social, situational, and
environmental context.7 6 Therefore, the state psychiatrist's predic-
tion will often be based upon facts ranging from actual past violent
behavior to mere verbal suggestions of less than socially condoned
conduct, such as refusing to take prescribed medication. Conse-
quently, an attorney should attack such predictions on the grounds
that they are based on vague speculation cloaked in the mystique
of psychiatric jargon. Counsel should attempt to dissect the found-
ation on which the prediction rests. Since the prediction is often
based on an accumulation of behavioral components, each of which
rests upon mere probability, each component should be analyzed
as to its validity and reliability in predicting dangerousness. By
approaching the issue in this fashion, counsel will quite often find
that the psychiatrist does not have personal knowledge 77 of the
facts underlying his prediction. Often the psychiatrist has based
his opinion on nursing notes or other medical records. Such records
are simply a compilation of "facts" that merely reflect interpreta-
tions of a person's behavior by numerous unrelated individuals who
may or may not be qualified to make such assessments. Therefore,
counsel must carefully probe the psychiatrists knowledge of the
facts on which the prediction rests. An attorney should also contin-
ually suggest that such facts lack relevance, materiality, and cred-
ibility. By following this line of questioning the psychiatrist's pre-
diction can often be exposed as lacking in substance and credibility.
Finally, an attorney must remember that a mere prediction of
dangerousness, without reference to the degree of risk of its future
occurrence, is not enough to comply with the statutory criteria. It
must be established that the risk of such dangerousness is "substan-
tial.178 A mere possibility or probability of such a risk is not
enough.7 9 If the risk of dangerousness cannot be established as sub-
75. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 60; Rubin, Prediction of Dangerous-
ness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARcu. OF GEN. PSYCH. 397 (1972).
76. Rubin, supra note 75, at 400.
77. If it is established that the psychiatrist-witness is testifying to facts
not within his personal knowledge, an objection to such testimony
and a motion to strike would be appropriate and should be made.
See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 27-602, 705 (Reissue 1975).
78. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1009 (Supp. 1977).
79. In Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1968), the court
delineated various factors to be evaluated in assessing dangerousness:
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stantial by "clear and convincing proof' 80 the state has not met
its burden of proof.
VII. THE NEXUS REQUIREMENT
The concepts of "mental illness" and "dangerousness" within Ne-
braska's statutory scheme have been briefly discussed. However,
they were discussed as separate entities. To perceive them as such
would be misleading. The fact that both must be present to sustain
an involuntary commitment suggests a very special and necessary
interdependent relationship. Since mental illness without a show-
ing of dangerousness may not be a legally sufficient basis for invol-
untary commitment, and dangerousness without mental illness is
not a legally sufficient basis for involuntary commitment, it is evi-
dent that there must be a dynamic, causal relationship between the
two factors. One without the other cannot be a sufficient basis
for a commitment.
The statutory language clearly requires a causal nexus between
the elements of mental illness and dangerousness. Therefore, it is
reasonable to insist at the hearing that the state prove that the
alleged condition of dangerousness be causally related to, and arise
out of, the mental disorder. In essence, an attorney should force
the state to prove that the condition of dangerousness is the "prod-
uct" of the mental disorder."' If no nexus can be established be-
tween the two, then logic and reason dictate that the statutory cri-
terion has not been met and the petition must be dismissed.8 2
VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO COMMITMENT
The underlying philosophy of Nebraska's mental health commit-
"Predictions of dangerousness . . .require determinations of several
sorts: the type of conduct in which the individual may engage; the
likelihood or probability that he will in fact indulge in that conduct;
and the effect such conduct if engaged in will have on others." See
also Greenburg, Involuntary Psychiatric Commitments to Prevent
Suicide, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 227 (1974); Civil Commitment of Heroin
Addicts; A Panel Discussion, 1 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBs. 561 (1972);
Note, supra note 25; 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 532 (1972); 2 U.C.L.A.-
ALAsKA L. REV. 68 (1972).
80. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1036 (Reissue 1976).
81. See Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1957), for an ex-
cellent discussion of the "product test." This test has, in the past,
been most often applied in criminal cases involving the insanity de-
fense.
82. Brenner, Denial of Due Process and Civil Rights Under Sections 73
and 73a of the Mental Hygiene Law to Aged Seniles without Major
Mental Impairment, 34 N.Y.S.B.J. 19 (1962); DeCain, Commitment
Procedure and the Non-Mentally Ill, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 151 (1961).
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ment laws places a high priority on treating the mentally ill in
an environment that places the least amount of restrictions on the
individual's liberty, relative to the requirements of an effective
treatment plan. In fact, the stated policy underlying these statutes
is to encourage voluntary treatment alternatives. 3  Voluntary
treatment is the least restrictive alternative to an involuntary corn-
mitment for an indefinite duration.8 4 However, the facts of a par-
ticular case may not allow the option of voluntary treatment as
a realistic alternative. In that event, counsel must be prepared to
suggest to the board various alternatives to an involuntary commit-
ment that fall somewhere in between both ends of the spectrum
of restrictive environment.
The issue of a possible alternative to commitment could arise
during at least two stages of the proceedings. The issue may first
arise at or during the preliminary hearing. During this hearing,
facts may be developed that point to the inappropriateness of any
further proceedings aimed at commitment. Counsel should develop
facts that indicate that the subject can receive effective treatment
outside an institution and that the subject is willing to pursue such
a treatment alternative. If the subject has ever received voluntary,
out-patient treatment prior to the hearing, then this fact should
be emphasized. If records of such treatment are available they
should be introduced into evidence. In essence, counsel should in
appropriate cases attempt to present the subject as an individual
who may need treatment, but does not need to be committed to
receive it. If such a case can be developed at the preliminary hear-
ing stage, counsel should move the board for a continuance85 or
suspension 6 of further proceedings to give the subject time to in-
vestigate and pursue voluntary treatment alternatives. In doing
this counsel may be able to stop the proceedings before they reach
the final hearing stage.
This issue may also arise at the final hearing stage of the pro-
ceedings. This is the most critical stage of the commitment process.
Therefore, it is vital that counsel be prepared to present an argu-
ment that commitment should be considered only as a last resort.87
83. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1001 (Reissue 1976).
84. Id. § 83-1019.
85. Id. § 83-1054.
86. Id. § 83-1032.
87. The trend in court decisions supports the philosophy that involuntary
commitment should be considered as a last resort. Many have held
that the state must investigate all available alternatives to complete
confinement prior to ordering an involuntary commitment. These de-
cisions reflect the judiciary's growing awareness and recognition of
the need to vigorously protect the rights of the mentally ill to be
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To lay foundation for such an argument, counsel should thoroughly
cross-examine the examining psychiatrist as to whether the pro-
posed treatment plan could be effectively carried out through a treat-
ment program in a community setting. Further, if a social or case
worker has been assigned to the client, counsel should cross-ex-
amine the worker concerning whether less restrictive treatment
alternatives have been explored, and whether such alternatives are
available within the community. Finally, counsel should be pre-
pared to call as witnesses knowledgeable individuals to establish
the existence and availability of such treatment programs. If these
facts can be established, counsel should move the board for a con-
tinuance or suspension of the final hearing88 to investigate these
alternatives. If it is clear from the evidence that such alternatives
are available and that they constitute an effective and appropriate
treatment program, counsel should move to dismiss the petition on
the ground that the state has failed to prove that involuntary com-
mitment is necessary to prevent the harm described in section 83-
1009.89
The importance of investigating less restrictive alternatives to
commitment cannot be over-emphasized. This avenue of relief will
quite often be the only one open to an attorney and his client.
Therefore, counsel should always enter the proceedings with a well-
prepared alternative to an involuntary commitment.
IX. POST-COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS
From the time the petition is filed counsel should be aware of
the possibility of an unfavorable decision by the board. Accord-
ingly, he should prepare the case so as to preserve the record for
use in any future post-commitment proceedings. Consideration
should be given to the preservation of evidentiary objections as well
as preserving the record as to matters of law and fact. The goal
is to insure appellate or post-commitment review if the need arises.
The subject of a commitment proceeding that culminates in an
involuntary commitment has available a host of post-commitment
actions to challenge or review his commitment. Some of these are
provided under the commitment statutes. Others stem from separ-
free of unnecessary deprivations of liberty during the treatment proc-
ess. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); In re Ballay,
482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1967). See also Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70
MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1972).
88. NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 83-1036 (Reissue 1976).
89. Id. § 83-1009.
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ate state and federal statutes. Basically, there are at least six dif-
ferent causes of action that can be used to review or challenge an
involuntary commitment.
The first two causes of action to be considered are those found
in the commitment act that provide for appellate review.9 0 In es-
sence, the provisions of section 83-104391 provide for a two-tier ap-
pellate process. First, the final order of the board may be appealed
to the district court that has jurisdiction over the county in which
the hearing was held.9 2 An unsatisfactory decision by the district
court may then be appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.9 3 In
relation to these proceedings, two factors must be considered. First,
the appeal to the district court is de novo on the record.9 4 This
fact is further reason to make every attempt to make and preserve
a complete record of the board's proceedings. Finally, it must be
noted that the statute provides that the appeal procedure applicable
to appeals from the district court to the Nebraska Supreme Court
must be in accordance with the appeal procedures used in criminal
cases.95 However, the statute does not state which of these pro-
cedures apply. Since different criteria and procedures are used in
different types of criminal cases it is unclear as to how an attorney
should proceed.9 6 This problem might be remedied by an action
for declaratory judgment.
Next, counsel might consider the provisions allowing for a re-
view of the subject's treatment disposition.9 7 Though section 83-
90. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1043 (Reissue 1976). The relevant portion of
this section reads as follows:
The subject of a petition or the county attorney may appeal
a final order of the mental health board to the district court.
Such appeals shall be de novo on the record. A final order
of the district court may be appealed to the Supreme Court
in accordance with the procedure in criminal cases.
The procedure for the review of judgments in criminal cases may
be found at NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2301 to 2319 (Reissue 1975).
91. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1043 (Reissue 1976).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. For example, section 83-1043 does not state whether the procedures
used in reviewing misdemeanor cases are applicable, as opposed to
the procedures used to appeal felony or homicide cases. Since time
is of the essence in appellate procedure, the vague reference to "pro-
cedure in criminal cases" creates a real and substantial obstacle to
a timely review of an order of commitment.
97. NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1046 (Reissue 1976). This statute reads as fol-
lows:
Whenever it shall be shown, by any person, to the satisfac-
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104698 does not provide for what might be described as appellate
review in the usual sense of the term, it does provide two grounds
on which to challenge a subject's status under an involuntary com-
mitment.99 Further, it provides for two types of relief: discharge
from confinement, or change of the treatment plan to one that is
less restrictive. 0 0 This cause of action might be most appropriate
after exhausting the subject's alternatives under the appeal provis-
ions of section 83-1043. From the language of section 83-1046, it
does not appear to require that the action be filed within a specified
period of time, nor does it set any limitations on how many times
such an action may be filed.' 10 Its broad language gives it very
real value as an alternative to a direct appeal.
Under the commitment statutes, subjects in custody or receiving
treatment are accorded a number of specific rights. One such right
is that of petitioning for writs of habeas corpus. 10 2 This provision
is similar to those found in Nebraska's rules of criminal proce-
dure;10 3 however, it differs dramatically in its scope. Though it is
not uncommon to find a provision for writs of habeas corpus in
the statutory schemes of states having model commitment acts, very
little law has developed in this area. Such provisions are fertile
ground for the advancement of the rights of those committed to
institutions.
Finally, there is one other potential avenue open to the subject
to challenge his custody and commitment, that of a writ of habeas
corpus under the provisions of Nebraska's rules of criminal proce-
dure.10 4 The statutes appear on their face to be applicable to per-
sons in the custody of the state under an order of commitment.
Though there does not appear to be any judicial precedent on the
subject, it may be suggested that a person committed to a state
tion of the mental health board that either cause no longer
exists for the care or treatment or a less restrictive alternative
exists for a person committed as a mentally ill dangerous
person, the mental health board shall order the immediate
discharge of that person or change the treatment disposition.
When a change in disposition is in issue, due process protec-
tions afforded under this act shall attach to the subject.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. § 83-1066 (Reissue 1976). This section reads in part as follows:
"Subjects in custody or receiving treatment under this act shall have
the right: . . . (9) To file, either personally or by counsel, petitions
or applications for writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of challeng-
ing the legality of such subject's custody or treatment."
103. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-2801 to 2824 (Reissue 1975).
104. Id.
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institution may file under these provisions as an alternative to sec-
tion 83-1066(9).105 Such actions have been successful in other juris-
dictions, both state and federal.10 6 The potential for adequate relief
through this cause of action is certainly worth exploring.
This article has not attempted to discuss all the possible and
potential forms of post-commitment actions and relief. The respon-
sibility of molding the proper cause of action to the relief sought
rests with counsel. However, it is suggested that every possible
cause of action be considered so as to provide the broadest forum
in which to litigate the issues that will inevitably arise in the fu-
ture.
X. CONCLUSION
Attorneys, in their professional capacities, are accustomed to
operating in a variety of diverse settings. They may function as
a negotiator, counsellor, or advocate, depending on the demands of
the moment. However, due to the unique nature of a mental com-
mitment hearing these functions often blend into one. At best, this
can be an uncomfortable situation. Therefore, counsel must con-
sciously strive to always place the role of the advocate above all
others. The foregoing discussion was an attempt to very briefly
suggest avenues to follow in pursuing this goal. The road that
must be traveled in this pursuit is, at times, uncharted. Obstacles
will be placed in the attorney's path by "witch doctors" masquerad-
ing as psychologists and psychiatrists. Attorneys will be forced
to cross the threshhold of prisons posing as mental hospitals. At
times clients will appear to be from another galaxy. Yet an attor-
ney must not allow these obstructions to divert him from the path,
for the goal is too precious to forego--the protection of the spirit
and dignity of those alleged to be "mentally ill dangerous persons."
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1066 (Reissue 1976).
106. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Dobson v. Cameron,
383 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1966).
